A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE
DAVID HUME
Containing only the introduction
INTRODUCTION
Nothing is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover any thing new to
the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems,
by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them. And indeed were they content
with lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most important questions, that
can come before the tribunal of human reason, there are few, who have an acquaintance with
the sciences, that would not readily agree with them. ’Tis easy for one of judgment and
learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtained the
greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to accurate and profound reasoning.
Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in
the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems
of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself.
Nor is there requir’d such profound knowledge to discover the present imperfect condition of
the sciences, but even the rabble without doors may judge from the noise and clamour, which
they hear, that all goes not well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate,
and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most trivial question escapes
not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able to give any certain decision.
Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with
the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustle ’tis not reason, which
carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the
most extravagant hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable colours.
The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by the
trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the army.
From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against metaphysical reasonings of all
kinds, even amongst those, who profess themselves scholars, and have a just value for every
other part of literature. By metaphysical reasonings, they do not understand those on any
particular branch of science, but every kind of argument, which is any way abstruse, and
requires some attention to be comprehended. We have so often lost our labour in such
researches, that we commonly reject them without hesitation, and resolve, if we must for ever
be a prey to errors and delusions, that they shall at least be natural and entertaining. And
indeed nothing but the most determined scepticism, along with a great degree of indolence, can
justify this aversion to metaphysics. For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, ’
tis certain it must lie very deep and abstruse; and to hope we shall arrive at it without pains,
while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains, must certainly be esteemed
sufficiently vain and presumptuous. I pretend to no such advantage in the philosophy I am
going to unfold, and would esteem it a strong presumption against it, were it so very easy and
obvious.
’Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; and that
however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or
another. Even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure
dependent on the science of Man; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged
of by their powers and faculties. ’Tis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we
might make in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of
human understanding, and cou’d explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the
operations we perform in our reasonings. And these improvements are the more to be hoped
for in natural religion, as it is not content with instructing us in the nature of superior powers,
but carries its views farther, to their disposition towards us, and our duties towards them; and
consequently we ourselves are not only the beings, that reason, but also one of the objects,
concerning which we reason.
If therefore the sciences of Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, have such
a dependence on the knowledge of man, what may be expected in the other sciences, whose
connexion with human nature is more close and intimate? The sole end of logic is to explain
the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas: morals and
criticism regard our tastes and sentiments: and politics consider men as united in society, and
dependent on each other. In these four sciences of Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics, is
comprehended almost every thing, which it can any way import us to be acquainted with, or
which can tend either to the improvement or ornament of the human mind.
Here then is the only expedient, from which we can hope for success in our philosophical
researches, to leave the tedious lingering method, which we have hitherto followed, and
instead of taking now and then a castle or village on the frontier, to march up directly to the
capital or center of these sciences, to human nature itself; which being once masters of, we
may every where else hope for an easy victory. From this station we may extend our
conquests over all those sciences, which more intimately concern human life, and may
afterwards proceed at leisure to discover more fully those, which are the objects of pure
curiosity. There is no question of importance, whose decision is not compriz’d in the science
of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we become
acquainted with that science. In pretending therefore to explain the principles of human nature,
we in effect propose a complete system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely
new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security.
And as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid
foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation. ’Tis
no astonishing reflection to consider, that the application of experimental philosophy to moral
subjects should come after that to natural at the distance of above a whole century; since we
find in fact, that there was about the same interval betwixt the origins of these sciences; and
that reckoning from Thales to Socrates, the space of time is nearly equal to that betwixt my
Lord Bacon[1] and some late philosophers in England, who have begun to put the science of
man on a new footing, and have engaged the attention, and excited the curiosity of the public.
So true it is, that however other nations may rival us in poetry, and excel us in some other
agreeable arts, the improvements in reason and philosophy can only be owing to a land of
toleration and of liberty.
Nor ought we to think, that this latter improvement in the science of man will do less honour
to our native country than the former in natural philosophy, but ought rather to esteem it a
greater glory, upon account of the greater importance of that science, as well as the necessity it
lay under of such a reformation. For to me it seems evident, that the essence of the mind
being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible to form
any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and
the observation of those particular effects, which result from its different circumstances and
situations. And tho’ we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by
tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and
fewest causes, ’tis still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that
pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected
as presumptuous and chimerical.
I do not think a philosopher, who would apply himself so earnestly to the explaining the
ultimate principles of the soul, would show himself a great master in that very science of
human nature, which he pretends to explain, or very knowing in what is naturally satisfactory
to the mind of man. For nothing is more certain, than that despair has almost the same effect
upon us with enjoyment, and that we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of
satisfying any desire, than the desire itself vanishes. When we see, that we have arrived at the
utmost extent of human reason, we sit down contented; tho’ we be perfectly satisfied in the
main of our ignorance, and perceive that we can give no reason for our most general and most
refined principles, beside our experience of their reality; which is the reason of the mere
vulgar, and what it required no study at first to have discovered for the most particular and
most extraordinary phenomenon. And as this impossibility of making any farther progress is
enough to satisfy the reader, so the writer may derive a more delicate satisfaction from the
free confession of his ignorance, and from his prudence in avoiding that error, into which so
many have fallen, of imposing their conjectures and hypotheses on the world for the most
certain principles. When this mutual contentment and satisfaction can be obtained betwixt the
master and scholar, I know not what more we can require of our philosophy.
But if this impossibility of explaining ultimate principles should be esteemed a defect in the
science of man, I will venture to affirm, that ’tis a defect common to it with all the sciences,
and all the arts, in which we can employ ourselves, whether they be such as are cultivated in
the schools of the philosophers, or practised in the shops of the meanest artizans. None of
them can go beyond experience, or establish any principles which are not founded on that
authority. Moral philosophy has, indeed, this peculiar disadvantage, which is not found in
natural, that in collecting its experiments, it cannot make them purposely, with premeditation,
and after such a manner as to satisfy itself concerning every particular difficulty which may
arise. When I am at a loss to know the effects of one body upon another in any situation, I
need only put them in that situation, and observe what results from it. But should I endeavour
to clear up after the same manner any doubt in moral philosophy, by placing myself in the
same case with that which I consider, ’tis evident this reflection and premeditation would so
disturb the operation of my natural principles, as must render it impossible to form any just
conclusion from the phenomenon. We must therefore glean up our experiments in this science
from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common
course of the world, by men’s behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures. Where
experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish on
them a science, which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to
any other of human comprehension.
NOTES--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] Mr. Locke, my Lord Shaftsbury, Dr. Mandeville, Mr. Hutchinson, Dr. Butler, &c.
DAVID HUME
Containing only the introduction
INTRODUCTION
Nothing is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover any thing new to
the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems,
by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them. And indeed were they content
with lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most important questions, that
can come before the tribunal of human reason, there are few, who have an acquaintance with
the sciences, that would not readily agree with them. ’Tis easy for one of judgment and
learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtained the
greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to accurate and profound reasoning.
Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in
the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems
of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself.
Nor is there requir’d such profound knowledge to discover the present imperfect condition of
the sciences, but even the rabble without doors may judge from the noise and clamour, which
they hear, that all goes not well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate,
and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most trivial question escapes
not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able to give any certain decision.
Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with
the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustle ’tis not reason, which
carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the
most extravagant hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable colours.
The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the sword; but by the
trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the army.
From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against metaphysical reasonings of all
kinds, even amongst those, who profess themselves scholars, and have a just value for every
other part of literature. By metaphysical reasonings, they do not understand those on any
particular branch of science, but every kind of argument, which is any way abstruse, and
requires some attention to be comprehended. We have so often lost our labour in such
researches, that we commonly reject them without hesitation, and resolve, if we must for ever
be a prey to errors and delusions, that they shall at least be natural and entertaining. And
indeed nothing but the most determined scepticism, along with a great degree of indolence, can
justify this aversion to metaphysics. For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, ’
tis certain it must lie very deep and abstruse; and to hope we shall arrive at it without pains,
while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains, must certainly be esteemed
sufficiently vain and presumptuous. I pretend to no such advantage in the philosophy I am
going to unfold, and would esteem it a strong presumption against it, were it so very easy and
obvious.
’Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; and that
however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or
another. Even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure
dependent on the science of Man; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged
of by their powers and faculties. ’Tis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we
might make in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of
human understanding, and cou’d explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the
operations we perform in our reasonings. And these improvements are the more to be hoped
for in natural religion, as it is not content with instructing us in the nature of superior powers,
but carries its views farther, to their disposition towards us, and our duties towards them; and
consequently we ourselves are not only the beings, that reason, but also one of the objects,
concerning which we reason.
If therefore the sciences of Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, have such
a dependence on the knowledge of man, what may be expected in the other sciences, whose
connexion with human nature is more close and intimate? The sole end of logic is to explain
the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas: morals and
criticism regard our tastes and sentiments: and politics consider men as united in society, and
dependent on each other. In these four sciences of Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics, is
comprehended almost every thing, which it can any way import us to be acquainted with, or
which can tend either to the improvement or ornament of the human mind.
Here then is the only expedient, from which we can hope for success in our philosophical
researches, to leave the tedious lingering method, which we have hitherto followed, and
instead of taking now and then a castle or village on the frontier, to march up directly to the
capital or center of these sciences, to human nature itself; which being once masters of, we
may every where else hope for an easy victory. From this station we may extend our
conquests over all those sciences, which more intimately concern human life, and may
afterwards proceed at leisure to discover more fully those, which are the objects of pure
curiosity. There is no question of importance, whose decision is not compriz’d in the science
of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we become
acquainted with that science. In pretending therefore to explain the principles of human nature,
we in effect propose a complete system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely
new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security.
And as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid
foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation. ’Tis
no astonishing reflection to consider, that the application of experimental philosophy to moral
subjects should come after that to natural at the distance of above a whole century; since we
find in fact, that there was about the same interval betwixt the origins of these sciences; and
that reckoning from Thales to Socrates, the space of time is nearly equal to that betwixt my
Lord Bacon[1] and some late philosophers in England, who have begun to put the science of
man on a new footing, and have engaged the attention, and excited the curiosity of the public.
So true it is, that however other nations may rival us in poetry, and excel us in some other
agreeable arts, the improvements in reason and philosophy can only be owing to a land of
toleration and of liberty.
Nor ought we to think, that this latter improvement in the science of man will do less honour
to our native country than the former in natural philosophy, but ought rather to esteem it a
greater glory, upon account of the greater importance of that science, as well as the necessity it
lay under of such a reformation. For to me it seems evident, that the essence of the mind
being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible to form
any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and
the observation of those particular effects, which result from its different circumstances and
situations. And tho’ we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by
tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and
fewest causes, ’tis still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that
pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected
as presumptuous and chimerical.
I do not think a philosopher, who would apply himself so earnestly to the explaining the
ultimate principles of the soul, would show himself a great master in that very science of
human nature, which he pretends to explain, or very knowing in what is naturally satisfactory
to the mind of man. For nothing is more certain, than that despair has almost the same effect
upon us with enjoyment, and that we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of
satisfying any desire, than the desire itself vanishes. When we see, that we have arrived at the
utmost extent of human reason, we sit down contented; tho’ we be perfectly satisfied in the
main of our ignorance, and perceive that we can give no reason for our most general and most
refined principles, beside our experience of their reality; which is the reason of the mere
vulgar, and what it required no study at first to have discovered for the most particular and
most extraordinary phenomenon. And as this impossibility of making any farther progress is
enough to satisfy the reader, so the writer may derive a more delicate satisfaction from the
free confession of his ignorance, and from his prudence in avoiding that error, into which so
many have fallen, of imposing their conjectures and hypotheses on the world for the most
certain principles. When this mutual contentment and satisfaction can be obtained betwixt the
master and scholar, I know not what more we can require of our philosophy.
But if this impossibility of explaining ultimate principles should be esteemed a defect in the
science of man, I will venture to affirm, that ’tis a defect common to it with all the sciences,
and all the arts, in which we can employ ourselves, whether they be such as are cultivated in
the schools of the philosophers, or practised in the shops of the meanest artizans. None of
them can go beyond experience, or establish any principles which are not founded on that
authority. Moral philosophy has, indeed, this peculiar disadvantage, which is not found in
natural, that in collecting its experiments, it cannot make them purposely, with premeditation,
and after such a manner as to satisfy itself concerning every particular difficulty which may
arise. When I am at a loss to know the effects of one body upon another in any situation, I
need only put them in that situation, and observe what results from it. But should I endeavour
to clear up after the same manner any doubt in moral philosophy, by placing myself in the
same case with that which I consider, ’tis evident this reflection and premeditation would so
disturb the operation of my natural principles, as must render it impossible to form any just
conclusion from the phenomenon. We must therefore glean up our experiments in this science
from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common
course of the world, by men’s behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures. Where
experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish on
them a science, which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to
any other of human comprehension.
NOTES--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] Mr. Locke, my Lord Shaftsbury, Dr. Mandeville, Mr. Hutchinson, Dr. Butler, &c.